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INTRODUCTION 
 A fundamental question that commentators have asked since the inception of the 
corporation is whether a corporation is merely a tool to make profits for its shareholders, or, as a 
construct of society, does it owe that society certain obligations.1  Currently, corporate law in the 
United States mandates that a corporation’s sole obligation is to its corporate shareholders.2  
While this view of corporations is popular among investors and free market proponents, many 
activists and commentators have argued that corporations should actively consider the effects 
corporate decisions have on other constituencies, most notably employees, customers, and 
neighbors.3  However, advocates differ on what Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is, and 
how a corporation can ensure that it is a responsible member of society.4  At the same time, 
critics argue that the only social responsibility corporations have is to their shareholders and that 
CSR violates the principles of free market society.5 
 Many corporations, such as Nike, Inc. (Nike) and BP, plc (BP) have voluntarily 
implemented CSR programs for a variety of reasons.6  These programs have had mixed success 
and are often met with skepticism from the public as mere ploys for publicity.7  Additionally, the 
legality of CSR programs is unsettled and voluntary programs might subject the corporation and 
its directors to civil liability should shareholders revolt over a perceived failure of the duty of 
loyalty or if corporate reporting on the programs proves incorrect.8  Perhaps most concerning for 
corporate directors, is the market’s reaction to corporate CSR programs as there is evidence the 
market devalues corporations when there is a perception that the directors are neglecting 
shareholder value.9  Because of the many disincentives, voluntary programs might not be 
effective to achieve the results many believe are possible.  While voluntary programs face 
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several hurdles, there is some evidence that CSR has long-term benefits to the corporation such 
as employee and customer loyalty, cost savings, and other potential benefits.10   
 As state, federal, and international governments deal with the aftermath of the current 
financial crisis, calls for increased use of CSR programs are inevitable.  However, with the 
current legal framework, corporate consideration of other constituencies is difficult as the 
corporations have a duty to shareholders.11  Further, voluntary CSR programs face potential 
hurdles including opening the corporation up to civil liability and market devaluation.  As a 
result, any policy promoting CSR needs support from changes in state or corporate law.  
Corporate law in the United States does not currently provide corporate executives the tools 
necessary to implement effective CSR programs, as the legality is suspect and there are no 
methods of ensuring compliance with voluntary programs.  In order to ensure that CSR programs 
are effective, the federal government should enact a comprehensive scheme to support the 
development of CSR programs, as well as provide enforcement mechanisms to ensure 
compliance. 
 This paper proceeds in three parts.  Part I begins by discussing the difficulty in defining 
the concept of CSR.  It then discusses how corporations use CSR programs and ends with a 
discussion of the efficacy of the programs.  Part II deals with the legal issues surrounding 
corporations that attempt to enact CSR programs.  Finally, Part III analyzes the current 
framework and proposes that any attempt to reform the corporate environment to include CSR 
programs must begin with a federal statute.  
I.  WHAT IS CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY? 
 Before examining the intricacies of CSR, it is useful to examine what CSR is.  In trying 
to define CSR, commentators have had to examine the purpose of corporations in order to assess 
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what CSR is, and what it should do.12  Many try to define CSR broadly to encompass how 
corporations actually use the concept,13 while others define CSR, as they believe it should be.14  
Because it is such a broad concept, it is difficult to find a single definition, or to describe how 
corporations use the concept.  Still, attempting to define the concept and examining corporate use 
of CSR will illuminate some of the issues both proponents and detractors face in determining 
whether such practices are legal, whether they benefit society, and how they affect corporate 
profits.  
A. Defining Corporate Social Responsibility  
 In 1970, the Nobel winning American economist Milton Friedman argued in an article in 
the New York Times Magazine that the only responsibility of the corporation was to maximize 
its shareholders’ investment.15  In this perspective, corporate executives, the agents of the 
corporation’s shareholders, have a duty to manage the corporation to increase profits, thereby 
employing people, contributing to the local, national, and international economies, and creating 
valuable products.16  If executives implement policies that decrease the company’s profits, they 
are placing a tax on the shareholders, customers, or employees.17  At the same time, he 
recognized that CSR programs often provide benefits for the corporation or the shareholders by 
attracting new and better employees, creating good will in the communities, or by taking 
advantage of charitable deductibility laws that allow corporations to contribute more than 
shareholders could contribute individually.18 
 Friedman’s view, sometimes referred to as the minimalist view, has been widely held in 
the United States and the international community, but it is by no means the only view of what 
corporate social responsibility entails.19  In addition to the minimalist view, definitions have been 
divided into (1) philanthropic, (2) encompassing or stakeholder, and (3) social activist.20  Like 
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Friedman’s minimalist view, each of the definitions is more a description of what CSR should be 
or how corporations use it rather than an encompassing definition of the movement itself.  As 
mentioned above, the minimalist view is the view espoused by people like the economist Milton 
Friedman who argued that the only social responsibility a corporation might have is to the 
shareholders and that any other attempt by the corporation’s board and managers to consider 
external factors is wrong.21   
 Under the philanthropic view, the corporation’s primary objective is still to maximize 
shareholder profit, but the corporation may make charitable contributions.22  This view of CSR 
has been a major factor in the United States over the course of the last century, as corporations 
have found that it is an effective marketing tool and that charities such as the Ronald McDonald 
House generate tremendous good will.23  While corporate philanthropy is legal in all fifty states, 
many criticize the practice because it forces shareholder contribution, whereas if the funds used 
for charitable giving were paid as dividends, shareholders could contribute directly to their own 
charities.24   
 Proponents of the encompassing view, also known as the stakeholder view, believe that 
corporations must consider other constituencies when making decisions.25  Unlike the minimalist 
or charitable views, the encompassing method does not see the corporation as primarily a tool to 
enhance shareholder wealth.  Rather, as a legal person, the corporation, through its directors and 
managers, must consider the overarching effect each decision has on “employees, customers, 
creditors, and the community.”26  To some extent, this view is the current predominant view of 
those seeking to implement CSR, as proponents believe that forcing corporations to look at the 
interests of these diverse groups will improve the environment, labor standards, and lead to a 
more stable economy.27  Many states have incorporated the encompassing concept into their 
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corporate law using stakeholder statutes that permit management of corporations to examine the 
risk to non-shareholder stakeholders in the event of a takeover.28  Finally, the social activist view 
argues that corporations have an affirmative duty to benefit society as society gives the 
corporation and its investors the tools to create great wealth.29  Under this view, the corporation 
is viewed as an agent of change, improving the environment, improving the standard of living of 
its employees, and ensuring the safety of its customers.30 
 While these definitions are important to understanding the importance and purpose of 
corporations in the United States and the world, they are problematic when trying to examine the 
current trends in CSR as these definitions all refer to models of CSR rather than creating an 
encompassing definition.  In a recent symposium published by the Review of Environmental 
Economics and Policy, the authors each attempted to define CSR more broadly.31  Professors 
Robert Reinhardt, Robert Stavins, and Richard Vietor proposed the first and narrower definition 
of CSR in their article.32  They define CSR as “sacrificing profits in the social interest.”33  In 
contrast, Professor Portney argued that defining CSR so narrowly would make the list of 
corporations undertaking CSR very small, as most corporations are implementing social policy 
that does not affect corporate profits.34  In Portney’s article, he posits that the appropriate 
definition of CSR is any action by the executives of a corporation that goes beyond the 
governing regulations in regards to the environment, labor practices, product safety, and 
community investments.35  Under Portney’s definition, a corporation could remain faithful to 
Friedman’s free market beliefs while being socially responsible, as long as those actions above 
the regulatory minimum were also in the best interest of the shareholders.36  Using the narrower 
definition proposed by Reinhardt and his associates, such actions often would not be CSR as the 
programs do not negatively impact corporate profits37 
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B.  Background on CSR 
 CSR is not a new concept.  Successful individuals have long felt the need or social 
compulsion to repay society for their success.38  In modern history, the twentieth century 
industrialists, such as the Rockefellers and Carnegies felt the need to contribute to society 
through vast charitable campaigns, building schools, libraries, and other community assets.39  
Even today, modern corporations still give enormous amounts to charities, the arts, and 
educational institutions.40  Over the last century, however, corporations pressured by labor 
organizations, activists, and society as a whole have begun to take notice of the effects business 
has on various constituencies.41  In recognition of their effect on society, many corporations are 
going beyond philanthropy and charitable giving and enacting policies that proactively respond 
to the pressures and effects on constituencies.42  Outside of the business community, activists 
promote CSR as a means to achieve additional social welfare, particularly when it comes to labor 
practices in developing countries and the environment.43  
 1.  Nike’s Board used CSR Programs to Respond to Allegations of Worker Abuse in 
Southeast Asia 
 
 Over the last three decades, many manufacturers with production facilities in developing 
countries have dealt with charges of unfair labor practices.  This has particularly affected 
clothing manufacturers such as Nike and Gap, Inc., which have come under scrutiny due to the 
working conditions in factories producing their clothing.44  Recognizing that these incidents have 
led to poor publicity as well as concern about the corporation’s reputation and bottom line, the 
boards of companies like Nike have taken measures to alleviate the negative publicity.   
 In the 1990s, several news stories tarnished Nike’s image by uncovering the poor labor 
standards in the factories producing Nike’s footwear and apparel.45  The stories uncovered 
allegations of substandard pay, child labor, and poor working conditions.46  Because of the 
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articles, Nike faced strong criticism, especially among members of the anti-globalization 
movement.47  Protests were particularly strong on college campuses, where Nike had lucrative 
deals to produce licensed apparel for the sports teams.48 
 At first, Nike executives argued that it had no control over the working conditions in the 
factories as they were hired under contract and not directly owned by Nike.49  Eventually 
realizing that it had to respond, executives began to work proactively in order to improve the 
corporation’s image.50  The first step Nike managers took was to institute codes of conduct that 
suppliers had to sign.51  The code required the suppliers to monitor environmental and other 
health standards as well as maintain a set of basic labor practices.52  Nike has also required the 
suppliers to ensure employees met a minimum age requirement and that the factories satisfy US 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration Standards.53  A compliance department visits 
and monitors suppliers for compliance with labor and environmental regulations.54  Even with 
these enhanced procedures, Nike still faces criticism that it is not doing enough to protect the 
workers in its factories.55  As a sign of its commitment to social responsibility, Nike has begun to 
report its success on its website Nikebiz.com as well in a biannual report detailing its strategic 
vision for its CSR policies.56  In particular, the report highlights the steps Nike is taking to ensure 
that its products are produced under fair labor standards, as well as in a sustainable manner.57  
Due to these steps, Nike is quickly building a reputation as a leader in fair labor standards.58 
 Nike is not alone in the textile industry in trying to improve corporate image with internal 
codes of conduct and other CSR programs.59  However, internal codes require self-monitoring 
and with the large number of factories that Nike and other companies such as Levi’s and Reebok 
use to manufacture products, it be difficult or cost prohibitive to ensure that the codes are truly 
enforced.60  Because internal codes of conduct require self-enforcement, the codes have been 
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criticized as “the fox monitoring the henhouse.”61  In reaction to this criticism, as well as to the 
failure of many of the individual internal codes of conduct, trade organizations and Non 
Governmental Organizations have developed “multi-stakeholder” codes of conduct.62  While 
these multi-stakeholder codes have the effect of standardizing labor practices, because of the 
large number of codes corporations can select which code best fits their needs.63  Additionally, 
academics wonder whether these codes of conduct are effective at curbing unfair practices.64  
While there seems to be some evidence that Nike has taken steps in the right direction and 
despite its improving reputation, there are still many who are unconvinced that the company has 
truly changed its practices.65 
 2.  British Petroleum 
 
 Like the textile industry, the energy services and food industries have seen calls for 
increased corporate responsibility.  The environmental movement, in particular, has argued that 
corporations have a responsibility to prevent environmental harm caused by manufacturing and 
energy consumption.  Corporations have responded to that pressure, as well as a general change 
in consumer demand, by providing “green products” and promoting the corporation as a “green 
business.”66  Many of these businesses may be truly concerned about their business’s effect on 
the environment, but it is also possible these businesses are reacting to the increased cost of fuel 
and the global movement towards conservation and environmentalism.67     
 Corporations, such as BP, have attempted to develop a culture of corporate social 
responsibility, particularly as it relates to the environment.68  For example, BP has attempted to 
develop a sustainable energy company by investing in so-called clean technologies.69    
Likewise, BP has implemented several programs to improve safety, sustainability, and 
environmental concerns.70  One interesting program is the institution of stakeholder meetings in a 
 9 
number of locales to ensure that it is listening to stakeholder opinions.71  Most notably, BP has 
accepted the findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which hold that global 
climate change is occurring and is very likely caused by humans.72  Because of this acceptance, 
the corporation has put programs in place, both in the corporation as a whole as well as in local 
operations to limit and reduce overall carbon emissions of the corporation.73  Further, in addition 
to achieving carbon reduction among its traditional hydro-carbon based industry, it has invested 
in and begun research in renewable energy sources such as solar and bio-fuels.74  While some 
commentators have hailed these moves, critics remain who point to BP’s reliance on production 
of natural gas as a sign the corporation has not done enough.75   
C.  Why Corporations Implement CSR Policies 
 Corporations use CSR programs for a variety of reasons.  Like Nike and BP, many 
corporations are responding to external pressure and bad publicity.  However, other corporations 
are responding to other factors.  These factors include better customer relations, employee 
loyalty, attracting investors, promoting community good will, better relationships with 
regulators, and improving the bottom line.76  Some corporate executives believe that ensuring 
happy employees, neighbors, or other constituencies are vital to the corporation’s long-term 
strategy.  An early example of an executive who held this belief was Henry Ford, who attempted 
to use excess corporate profits to pay workers higher wages and to invest in long term growth as 
opposed to paying profits out as dividends.77  
 Some corporations have enacted CSR policies to differentiate themselves from their 
competition.78  By enacting CSR programs, the corporations appeal to a certain investor or 
customer.79  Two corporations that have employed this philosophy are Ben and Jerry’s 
Homemade Holdings, Inc. (Ben and Jerry’s) and Whole Foods Market, Inc. (Whole Foods).80  
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Both of these companies from their inception have viewed socially responsible business as a 
means of building market share.81  Ben and Jerry’s has emphasized that its products, both the 
product itself and the packaging, come from sustainable and environmentally friendly 
processes.82  Likewise, Whole Foods Market motto is “Whole Foods, Whole People, Whole 
Planet,” emphasizing that company’s commitment to the environment, its customers, and its 
employees.83  In particular, Whole Foods works to ensure that its products are produced in a 
sustainable nature and even sources many of its fresh goods from local sources.84  Other 
corporations, like McDonalds have undertaken CSR programs in response to a change in social 
values or a concern that current practices will lead to bad publicity or a loss in market share.85  
 Like the desire to set themselves apart from customers, many corporate executives may 
be concerned with attracting investors.  Just as there are customers who will look for a product 
from a corporation with a “responsible” reputation or label, there are investors interested in 
supporting corporations that have CSR programs.86  These executives believe that a CSR 
program will allow their business practices to align with the investor’s beliefs, or that an investor 
will believe the program will create a good return on investment.87 
 Finally, other corporate executives are interested in a well-trained and efficient workforce 
that is loyal to the corporation.  Theoretically, a happy workforce should improve efficiency, as 
the corporation would enjoy lower costs associated with employee turnover.  An example of a 
corporation that is implementing an employee loyalty program is Costco.88  Costco provides a 
generous benefits package to its employees in the belief that this will create a happy and loyal 
workforce, leading to long-term cost savings from reduced employee turnover.89  Another 
example of a corporation emphasizing employee morale is Whole Foods Market.  In addition to 
its emphasis of sustainable development, its management tries to ensure employee morale 
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through safety and benefits programs.90  Most individuals would want to work for a corporation 
where they felt their contribution was valued.91 
D. Efficacy of CSR Programs: Do They Deliver the Promised Results 
 Due to a number of reasons, it is difficult to determine whether CSR Programs are 
successful as there is little reliable evidence that measures the effect of these programs on society 
or on the corporations themselves.92  Companies like Nike have implemented broad CSR 
programs and, as mentioned before, Nike is now considered “the global leader when it comes to 
improving labor standards in developing-country factories.”93  Still, it faces many critics who 
feel it has not done enough to curb abuses in its suppliers’ factories.94  Likewise, BP faces 
continued criticism that it relies too heavily on Natural Gas and other hydrocarbon based fuels to 
demonstrate a decreased reliance on petroleum production.95  However, by adopting its own cap 
and trade system for carbon emissions, BP claims to have saved $600 Million Dollars and 
preserved public good will.96  More importantly for the environmental critics, BP claims to have 
made real reductions in carbon dioxide emissions in the last seven years because of its 
programs.97  Whether these programs are effective at curbing the alleged labor or environmental 
issues is often a matter of perspective and difficult to determine. 
 One sign that investors value corporations with CSR programs is the proliferation of 
funds that look for corporations employing CSR programs.98  It has been reported that up to $2 
trillion in assets are in funds that screen for at least some manifestation of CSR.99  However, as 
these are newer funds, it is too early to tell if they will remain attractive to investors as their 
reported track records are poor relative to other funds.100  While the current popularity of the 
funds points towards investor interest in CSR programs, there is some anecdotal evidence that 
CSR programs may result in an undervalued stock price.101  One example is that of the bulk 
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retailer Costco.102  The company is dedicated to its employees and pays them a higher wage and 
better benefits than its competitor Sam’s Club pays.  While Costco argues that this has resulted 
in cost savings as they have a productive and happy workforce resulting in fewer turnovers, the 
corporation’s stock price trades at a lower premium than Wal-mart, Sam’s Club’s parent 
company, ostensibly because the market believes the benefits are too generous.103  Further, when 
markets have fully anticipated CSR costs, initial public offerings of stock will often sell at a 
discount, with entrepreneurs bearing the cost of the responsible activities.104 
 In addition to the possibility of attracting investors, some corporations have seen positive 
results in regards to business efficiency from the use of CSR programs.  One example in 
particular is the Chiquita Corporation.105  Chiquita and its predecessor companies have operated 
for over a century producing bananas in Latin America.106  During that time, it spurred economic 
development by creating jobs on its farms and building the infrastructure needed to transport the 
bananas to market; however, it was also known for oppressive labor practices and interfering 
with sovereign governments, including participating in the overthrow of the Guatemalan 
government in the 1950s.107  In the 1990s, the corporation began to implement a number of 
policies with the aim of improving farming practices, labor standards, and the corporate 
image.108  One of the most important steps was its voluntary participation with non-governmental 
organizations dedicated to more sustainable banana farming practices.109  The company also 
reworked its relationship with the labor unions as well as implemented training for managers on 
the corporation’s new policies.110  Early signs of success have included reduced costs associated 
with worker health, safety, and the choice by a group of major European retailers to purchase 
bananas from Chiquita.111   
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 There is evidence that the public views the treatment of customers and employees as the 
most important issue for a business to address, with a study conducted by the Mori Research 
institute in Britain finding that 29% of the population was at least interested in “ethical” 
goods.112  At the same time, most of the “responsible” purchasers were upscale purchasers with a 
large portion of the rest of the “ethical” purchasers under the age of 25 and motivated by brand 
name.113   In the current economic environment, it is possible that the group interested in 
purchasing ethical goods and services will succumb to market pressures, namely the tight 
economy, and look to purchase less expensive products 
II.  THE LEGAL STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
 For most of the twentieth century, states and courts asserted that corporate directors 
should run corporations for the profit of the shareholders.114  Because shareholders owned the 
corporation, the directors were the shareholder’s agents and thus had fiduciary duties to serve in 
the shareholder’s best interests.115  As the fiduciary duties require corporations to maximize 
shareholder profits, any attempts to consider external constituencies or stakeholders would 
violate the duty to those shareholders.116  This would ostensibly ensure that any CSR programs 
that do not have a clear benefit for shareholders would face legal challenges from shareholders, 
as they would violate this principle.117  On the other hand, when courts are asked to review 
director and officer decisions, they employ the Business Judgment Rule, which is deferential to 
the directors and the decisions they make, meaning courts are reluctant to second-guess their 
decisions.118   
 In reaction to the takeover movement of the 1980s and 1990s, many states enacted 
stakeholder statutes in an effort to protect local corporations, and local jobs from the threat of 
hostile takeovers.119  These statutes theoretically allow corporations to invoke the name of 
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external shareholders such as employees, the community, and other constituencies, the statutes 
are mostly permissive.  Further, none of the statutes incorporates an enforcement mechanism that 
would allow shareholders to force corporations to consider the needs of other constituencies 
when making decisions.120  While most states have enacted stakeholder laws there are still a 
handful of states that have not.121  This allows most corporations to opt out of the statutes just by 
virtue of where the corporation is incorporated.   
A. Shareholder Primacy: The Corporate Board’s Duty to Maximize Shareholder Wealth 
 In United States corporate law, directors, as agents of the shareholders, owe the 
shareholders a duty to manage the corporation to the shareholder’s benefit, usually seen as 
maximizing the value of the company’s shares.122  This view of the corporation, often referred to 
as shareholder primacy, is similar to the principle that Milton Friedman argued for in his 1970 
article discussed in Part I.A.123  The shareholders, as owners of the corporation, employ 
corporate directors, and, because of the employer-employee relationship, the director has a direct 
responsibility to the shareholder. 124  Advocates of this model argue that this agency relationship 
prevents directors and officers from considering other stakeholders.   
 This model of corporate governance received early credence in the Michigan case Dodge 
v. Ford Motor Co..125  The Dodge brothers, ten percent owners of the Ford Motor Co. sued the 
company seeking to compel dividends.126  In testimony before the trial court, Henry Ford argued 
that the corporation’s future policy was not to pay special dividends, but to put the money back 
into the company in order to improve the life of his employees.127  On appeal, the Michigan 
Supreme Court held that the company’s shareholders were entitled to dividends that Henry Ford 
had tried to withhold in order to pay employees higher wages and sell cars cheaper to the 
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public.128  In reaching its holding, the court held that corporations are organized “primarily for 
the profit of stockholders.”129  
 One question that the courts have not answered clearly in the years since Dodge v. Ford 
Motor Co. is whether corporate executives are to manage the company for the short-term or 
long-term benefit of the shareholders.130  The case itself implies that short-term gain was the 
main purpose, as it required Ford to issue special dividends rather than investing in long-term 
growth.131  However, other courts have allowed executives to focus on long-term goals.  In 
Shlensky v. Wrigley, the Illinois Supreme Court sided with Wrigley’s directors, who believed that 
the decision to install lighting in order to play night games might hurt the shareholders in the 
short term but would ultimately be in their long-term interests as lights might ultimately cause 
the neighborhood to deteriorate, leading to crime and deters customers.132 
 While shareholder primacy is the consensus in the United States, courts often protect the 
decisions of the board through use of the business judgment rule.133  The Business Judgment 
Rule (BJR) “acts as a presumption in favor of corporate managers’ actions.”134  Effectively, the 
rule protects a director’s decisions under the theory that the director, as an expert, is better suited 
to making business decisions than the courts.135  The case, In Re Walt Disney Co. Derivative 
Litigation is an example of the difficulty a plaintiff may face when attempting to overcome the 
presumption created by the BJR.136  Plaintiffs sued over the severance package, estimated at 
$140 million, provided to Michael Ovitz when terminated a little over a year after he took office 
as Disney’s President.137  Ovitz and his friend Michael Eisner, Disney’s Chairman and CEO, 
negotiated the package prior to Ovitz’s employment with the corporation.138  While the Delaware 
Supreme Court acknowledged that the board and its compensation committee were not the 
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“paragons” of good management, it still held that the board had not violated any fiduciary duties 
in approving the original employment contract and in paying the large severance package.139   
 The concept of shareholder primacy is particularly strong in Delaware, home to a 
majority of the publicly traded corporations in the United States.  Since the 1980s, there have 
been several cases decided by the Delaware Supreme Court that are often cited as requiring 
corporate boards to maximize shareholder wealth.140  While these cases seem to imply that 
directors must maximize shareholder wealth, they are all dealing with corporate takeovers and 
takeover defenses, which makes determining the overall rule difficult.  Revlon v. MacAndrews & 
Forbes Holdings, Inc., held that when the corporation was up for sale, the directors’ must 
maximize shareholder value.141  Revlon, attempting to prevent a hostile takeover, employed 
several defensive techniques in addition to searching out a “white knight” suitor.142  The court 
ruled that because a sale of the corporation was inevitable, based on the fact the corporation was 
dealing with a “white knight,” the company’s consideration of employees was wrong and the 
board breached its fiduciary duty by failing to obtain the best price for the shareholder’s stock.143 
 In Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court seemed 
to take a step back from its ruling in Revlon by allowing Time’s board to consider Paramount a 
threat to its corporate culture.144  The Time board had long considered a strategic merger and had 
been in extensive discussion with Warner Brothers.145  When Paramount approached Time with a 
tender offer, Time and Warner renegotiated their deal.146  The court accepted the Time board’s 
argument that a takeover by Paramount would damage its corporate culture.147  In addition to the 
corporate culture, the Supreme Court seemed to open the door for boards to consider a range of 
stakeholders.148  However, in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc. the court 
distinguished Time on the facts by noting that Revlon had not applied to the case, as the break up 
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of the corporation was never inevitable.149  Furthermore, QVC confirmed that Revlon duties 
applied any time a change of control was inevitable, not just in a break up situation.150  Whether 
these rules apply outside of a take over situation is unclear, and even if they did, the BJR might 
still protect directors from liability. 
B.  Stakeholder Statutes: Allowing Corporate Boards to Consider External Constituencies 
 Because of the number of takeovers in the 1980s and 1990s, many states enacted statutes 
to try to protect local companies from hostile takeovers.151   Some of these statutes allowed, or 
even forced corporations to consider other constituencies when considering takeover offers.152  
Pennsylvania passed the first “stakeholder law,” and as of 2003, forty additional states had 
passed some form of stakeholder statute.153  These statutes vary in their operation, with at least 
nineteen of the statutes only taking effect when the corporation is in a takeover situation.154  
Most statutes give directors the ability to consider other constituencies; however, at least one 
state, Connecticut, mandates board consideration of non-shareholder constituencies when 
making decisions.155  While permissive, Pennsylvania, Iowa, and Indiana also have strongly 
worded statutes making it clear that corporate boards have the ability to consider other 
constituencies and they do not have to consider one group’s interests (i.e. the shareholders) over 
the interests of the other stakeholders.156 
 Although popular, stakeholder statutes have several problems.  The first problem with 
most statutes is the permissive nature of the statutes.157  Similarly, there is no enforcement 
mechanism to ensure that corporations are considering constituencies outside of the 
shareholders.158  Furthermore, the statutes are focused on preventing hostile takeovers.159  There 
are many instances outside of takeover law where stakeholders might need consideration.160  
Finally, a major concern with the stakeholder statutes is the possibility of corruption.161  Because 
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of the open nature of the statutes, directors and managers can entrench themselves by invoking 
the statute in order to justify defensive tactics.162   
C.  International CSR 
 CSR is not merely a U.S. concept, but has strong support globally, particularly in 
continental Europe.163  Common law countries, such as Britain, Australia, and New Zealand have 
laws and policies similar to U.S. corporate law and policies.164  These countries tend to favor the 
idea of maximizing shareholder wealth.165  Although they have implemented policies that 
provide some level of consideration of outside constituencies.166  On the other hand, laws in 
Continental Europe require actual consideration of other stakeholders, even to a greater extent 
than the stakeholder statutes in the United States.167  Many countries require labor participation 
on corporate boards, or have multiple tier board systems that allow for consideration of other 
stakeholders.168   
III.  MAKING CSR PROGRAMS WORK: EXAMINING THE CURRENT REGIME AND PROPOSING A NEW 
REGIME 
 
 Whether you restrict your definition of CSR to the maximization of shareholder wealth, 
or look at CSR more expansively and define it as corporations intentionally going beyond the 
minimum regulatory requirements, CSR is a growing movement in the United States.169  While 
proof of the efficacy of CSR programs is still light, the fact that companies such as Chiquita and 
Nike are continuing to expand programs may be a sign that their boards see long-term benefits to 
the programs.170  Furthermore, companies have claimed some increased efficiency and 
savings.171  As most CSR programs are based on long-term strategies, many of the programs may 
take time to pay dividends socially and to shareholders.172       
 Currently, as the predominant view of the corporation’s purpose is maximization of 
shareholder wealth, boards that want to implement CSR programs may face legal challenges 
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from shareholders alleging that the directors violated their fiduciary duties.173  However, even if 
the programs place corporate directors in violation of their fiduciary duties, courts may be 
reluctant to impose liability and find that the Business Judgment Rule protects the programs.174  
Rather than allow corporate boards to implement CSR programs with the hope that the BJR will 
protect their actions, it would be better for the boards and overall the corporations to implement 
governmental policy to support and protect corporate boards from shareholder liability.  The 
question then becomes, should government support CSR?  And if so, how? 
 Because of the current economic crisis, it seems likely that reforms to corporate laws are 
likely as lawmakers attempt to prevent similar crises to happen again.  After the Enron and 
WorldCom scandals of the early twenty first century, Congress passed The Public Accounting 
Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002 (commonly known as the Sarbanes-Oxley act, or 
SOX).175  One of the provisions of the act requires corporations to disclose codes of ethics, and if 
the corporation did not have a code, to justify why the corporation did not have a code.176  
However, it is unclear whether such an act would have saved Enron as it had a code of ethics, 
although its provisions were waived.177  With the current financing crisis, the federal government 
has taken an expanded role in the financial industry as well as the manufacturing industry, with 
the loans to and forced bankruptcies of Chrysler and General Motors.178  The crisis and the 
current increase in governmental control make it more likely that Congress will enact some type 
of federal corporate law.   
 Another possible reason to support a government policy of promoting CSR programs is 
the global influence on the market.  Shell’s experience with the Brent Spar platform in the North 
Sea is a good example of the effect the global marketplace can have on corporations.179  After 
receiving approval from the British Government to dispose of the Brent Spar Oil Platform in the 
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deep waters of the North Sea, Shell faced a barrage of criticism from Greenpeace and other Non 
Governmental Organizations as well as a boycott in Continental Europe.180  Because of these 
pressures, Shell relented and found a disposal method more acceptable to Greenpeace and the 
European consumers.181  This incident highlights the effect that globalization may have in the 
future on domestic corporations, particularly as Europe has already developed mandatory CSR 
programs.182  
 How best to promote CSR is a more difficult question.  While stakeholder statutes seem 
to be one option, the current statutes are limited as they are permissive, do not have enforcement 
mechanisms, and are specific to takeover situations.183  Furthermore, while a vast majority of 
states have these statutes, eight states, including Delaware, do not, leading to the problem of 
holdouts.  If CSR programs are beneficial and are to be the policy of the United States, then there 
should be a consistent application across the board to protect the directors as well as ensuring 
significant buy in on the part of corporations. 
A.  Voluntary Programs are Inherently Flawed 
 One argument is to allow corporations to adopt voluntary CSR programs and codes of 
ethics.  Although there is some evidence of CSR programs providing long-term benefits to 
corporations with CSR programs, many corporations will not voluntarily institute CSR programs 
because of the risks of litigation.  While companies like Nike and Chiquita have slowly improved 
their image, they still face critics that claim the programs are disingenuous and pander to the 
protestors without any real action.184  Without concrete results, and the quasi-legal nature of the 
programs, many corporations may forgo implementing CSR programs without some 
governmental mandate.  Any success corporations achieve in the goals of the program in 
addition to efficiency and cost savings may come at a cost in the stock market due to the 
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perception that the companies are wasting profits that could go towards shareholders, which 
could lead to claims of waste or other shareholder litigation.185  Furthermore, many of the 
corporations are using CSR programs, like Ben and Jerry’s and Whole Foods, to differentiate 
themselves from their competition through their responsible business plans.186  As discussed 
above, the number of ethical consumers is limited and most individuals are looking more for 
“price, taste, or sell-by date than ethics.”187  Overall, CSR programs can be expensive and 
therefore a hurdle for corporations that have a lower income clientele. 
 Voluntary CSR programs present corporations with another problem, namely competitors 
that have not implemented CSR programs.  While many corporations might join the movement, 
those corporations risk one competitor opting out.  Although the competitor that opts out risks a 
backlash from the public for its unethical behavior, it might also, due to efficiency, provide a 
cheaper product and take market share from the corporations with CSR programs.188  As many 
people, particularly in the current economic climate, prefer a good deal over ethical products, the 
corporation with the CSR program is at a disadvantage due to the higher cost of providing the 
goods and services.189 
 Because of the way many markets have developed, CSR programs are difficult to 
manage, particularly in industries such as the textile industry, where Nike and other 
manufacturers use a number of suppliers from around the globe.190  While these companies may 
try to ensure that the suppliers are treating workers humanely, there is evidence that at least some 
of the suppliers are falsifying records to meet the heightened labor requirements imposed on 
them by the contracting companies.191  Of course, it is possible that as more corporations face 
scandals, protest over labor practices, higher fuel costs, and other events, the number of 
conscientious consumers’ will increase and put pressure on corporations to implement CSR 
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programs.  Unless there is some mass change in consumer habits, it is unlikely that the markets 
alone will force corporations to behave more ethically. 
B.  Although the Business Judgment Rule Protects Corporate Decision-making, Boards still Run 
the Risk of Liability by Implementing CSR Programs 
 
 Although the consensus is that corporate directors and officers owe corporate 
shareholders the duties of care, loyalty, and good faith, assumed to mean that they must 
maximize shareholder wealth, in reality, courts are reluctant to second guess a corporate 
executive’s decisions on behalf of the corporation.192  As discussed in Part II.A, the Business 
Judgment Rule (BJR) is a presumption that the directors and officers of a corporation have acted 
in the best interests of the corporation.193  Because the courts presume that the directors, with 
specialized knowledge of the corporation’s operations and the market, can make better decisions 
than the court, if a shareholder challenged a board’s decision, a court would most likely uphold 
the decision.  The plaintiff must show that the board’s decision was made in bad faith, lacked 
due care, or was self interested, a difficult task to accomplish as the Disney case demonstrates.194 
 Because of the presumption the BJR creates, directors who implement CSR programs are 
probably shielded in the event of shareholder litigation.195  If the director or directors can 
demonstrate that the decision to implement the program was done on an informed basis and done 
with intent to benefit the corporation, the court will likely find the presumption precludes the 
shareholder’s cause of action.  Using Nike as an example, the corporation began to implement 
CSR programs after receiving damaging publicity regarding the labor standards in its Southeast 
Asian factories.196  The directors, seeing that the publicity generated by this scandal was 
tarnishing its image (or good will) and that it threatened or potentially threatened some of its 
lucrative college apparel contracts, acted in the best interests of the corporation and the 
shareholders by implementing a CSR regime to ensure fair labor standards in these factories.197  
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Similarly, Chiquita’s board can likely shield itself from shareholder litigation on the same 
principle.  By proactively working to change corporate practice, and hence Chiquita’s image, it 
was improving its good will and hopefully generating future business.  Because each of these 
corporate boards enacted CSR programs to protect the corporation, plaintiffs will have a difficult 
time challenging board actions.  Even so, while the BJR might theoretically shield corporations 
and directors from liability, the threat of litigation itself might be enough to chill a director’s 
desire to implement CSR programs due to the time and costs involved. 
 While the BJR might protect boards that implement CSR programs, the unsettled nature 
of the legality of the programs might deter boards and directors from implementing CSR 
programs.  In Delaware, as in other states, shareholder primacy is still the overriding policy, 
meaning corporations must maximize shareholder wealth.198  Unless the directors can justify the 
CSR program as a method of accomplishing that goal, they are in violation of this duty even if a 
court may not second guess their judgment.  This is particularly difficult for directors who have 
implemented CSR programs that fall into the extreme definition of programs that benefit society 
at the expense of profits.199  On the other hand, all states permit charitable contributions, one of 
the most obvious illustrations of a corporation benefiting society at the expense of the corporate 
bottom line.200  Finally, it would be better to amend the law than to continue to rely on the fact 
that courts tend to shield directors from liability for decisions made while running the 
corporation. 
C.  Stakeholder Statutes Alone Are Not Enough to Enforce Beneficial CSR Programs 
 Some commentators point toward stakeholder statutes as a solution to the legality 
question.201  Proponents argue that amending corporate law to allow corporations to consider 
other stakeholders – employees, neighbors, customers, etc. – corporations will be able to 
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implement CSR programs without fear of litigation.  However, the current stakeholder statutes 
have several main flaws that prevent them from being a legitimate solution to the problem of 
implementing CSR programs.  As mentioned above, the stakeholder statutes are permissive, have 
no real enforcement mechanism, some are applicable solely to takeovers.202  Without a 
mandatory statute with some form of enforcement mechanism, stakeholders have no way to 
ensure that corporations are meeting their interests.203  Unlike shareholders who have the ability 
to bring a derivative cause of action, stakeholders are not in privity with the corporation and 
cannot sue without some type of statutory right.  
 The second and possibly larger issue is the fact that Delaware does not have a stakeholder 
statute.  As half of all publicly held corporations (over 60% of Fortune 500 companies) are 
currently incorporated in Delaware, stakeholder statutes currently cannot have the impact desired 
by proponents.204  Until Delaware enacts a stakeholder statute, stakeholder statutes will not have 
the authority needed to institute a true CSR regime.  Further, because Delaware is such a popular 
state for corporations and because of the traditional shareholder centric policy, Delaware may be 
reluctant to pass a stakeholder statute, as it would upset the status quo.  Still, a broader 
stakeholder statute, particularly a federal statute, might be a valuable tool to promote responsible 
business.  
D.  A Federal CSR Statute 
 If promotion of CSR programs is to be policy of the United States, then reform of the 
current corporate law to allow CSR programs must be amended.  To best serve the needs of 
corporations, shareholders, and other stakeholders, the federal government should enact a series 
of statutes that create a federal policy of CSR, mandates at least some action on the part of 
corporations, and incentivizes the process.  This statute should mandate that all public 
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corporations publish an annual report detailing the corporations CSR programs, its successes and 
failures.  In addition, Congress should enact a law that creates incentives for corporations 
implementing CSR programs, through either tax relief, or other means to ensure that 
corporations opt into the program.  Finally, Congress should ensure that the laws passed 
emphasize the governmental policy is for a responsible business and permits corporate boards to 
consider all constituencies when making decisions. 
 1. Mandatory Reporting of CSR Programs 
 While many corporations already periodically report on their CSR programs, often times 
the public disregards the reports as mere public relations.205  If all public corporations were 
responsible for producing an annual report detailing their efforts on social responsibility, the 
skepticism displayed may diminish as the markets and the public become used to the reports.  
Further, if the reports were somehow standardized, the belief that they were public relations 
works would also diminish, as there would be little room for embellishment, similar to the 
financial reports required by the Securities Laws. 
 By making the reporting requirement mandatory, the statute would help the corporate 
holdout problem inherent in the current stakeholder statutes.206  While the statute will not require 
the corporations to consider stakeholders, by requiring the reports on CSR policies, it will in 
essence force corporations to begin considering other stakeholders, at the risk of seeming callous 
and cold when the corporation’s annual CSR report is published.  Similar to peer pressure among 
teenagers, corporations will implement CSR policies to ensure that their corporation does not 
lose good will due to the reports. 
 Furthermore, because the reports would be similar to the quarterly and annual financial 
reports, any false or misleading statements would subject the corporation and directors of the 
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corporation to criminal and civil sanctions similar to a material misrepresentation under 10b-5.  
This further enhances the reliability of the annual report, and the pressure it will place on 
corporations to enact valid CSR programs.  This reporting requirement could possibly be created 
as an amendment to SOX’s ethics code requirement, mandating an annual or some other periodic 
report to the SEC or other agency of the corporation’s activities regarding sustainability and 
employment practices.207  Of course, this highlights one of the biggest problems of the reporting 
requirement that of what should be included in any CSR report.  Should it be anything that goes 
beyond mere compliance with regulation, should it be anything that is done sacrificing profits, or 
does it include anything that is done in consideration of other constituencies outside of the 
shareholders.208 
 2. Incentive Programs to Encourage Participation 
 While the reporting program would act like a big stick to encourage corporations to 
implement CSR programs, some type of true incentive would assuage some of the anger over the 
CSR program requirement.  An incentive program that was attractive enough to the business 
community would ensure full compliance with the program.  As mentioned above, without full 
buy in, some corporations might choose to forego the CSR program because of the cost of some 
programs.  Again, what types of activities would receive incentives would have to be carefully 
considered, as well as how those incentives are used.  
 3.  The Federal Stakeholder Statute 
 In order to implement CSR programs, corporations must know that they will not face 
litigation from shareholders or the government for actions taken in furtherance of the program.209 
A federal stakeholder statute would alleviate some of these concerns by permitting corporations 
to consider the needs of stakeholders alongside shareholders.  In combination with the reporting 
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and incentive laws, this would again encourage corporations to consider the interest of 
stakeholders. 
 Currently, as a policy tool to promote CSR programs, stakeholder statutes suffer because 
they are permissive and a federal stakeholder statute may have similar issues.210  However, by 
requiring periodic reporting, the public, and the market will know which corporations have CSR 
programs in place.  Unlike the current scenario, where the market discounts corporations with 
CSR programs, corporations without CSR programs might face a situation like Nike, where the 
corporation has to use CSR in an effort to rehabilitate their brand image, which is necessary to 
sell products.211  Because of the risk these corporations face, they will be forced by their 
shareholders and other stakeholders to take action in order to prevent such an event from 
occurring. 
 Of course, one of the other issues with stakeholder statutes is the lack of an enforcement 
mechanism.212  However, even if a stakeholder statute had a private cause of action, how would 
the stakeholder have standing to sue the corporation?  Such a provision might allow neighbors of 
smaller corporations to sue, as there would be a clear number of parties that are affected by the 
corporate activities.  In larger corporations, like BP, Nike, or any other national or multinational 
corporation, the potential stakeholders are limitless.  Still, the main purpose behind the 
stakeholder statute is to authorize the board to consider the stakeholders.  The reporting and 
incentive laws would be the carrot and stick portions of the statute, putting the lack of 
compliance into the market, as well as incentivizing compliance with the statute.  
CONCLUSION 
 The current legal regime, focused on shareholder primacy, fails to give corporations the 
legal ability or incentives necessary to achieve an adequate result.  In an era where corporations 
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are incorporating CSR programs into their business plans for a variety of reasons, directors run 
the risk that they will face costly litigation, even though the Business Judgment Rule would most 
likely immunize the directors’ decisions.213  If encouraging CSR is to be a policy in the United 
States, corporate law must be amended to allow directors the flexibility to implement CSR that 
will both achieve the desired social results as well as allow the corporation to operate profitably 
without the risk of costly litigation. 
 A tripartite solution of reporting, incentives, and permissive language will allow 
corporations to implement programs that will benefit the corporation itself, through efficiency 
and reduced costs, as well as benefiting society in general.  Using the federal government to 
implement the scheme will solve the problem of hold-out-states and hold-out-corporations, as all 
publicly owned corporations will be subject to the regulations.  Further, the mandatory reporting, 
combined with the incentives, will push most corporations towards compliance.  Finally, by 
permitting corporations to consider stakeholders, the corporations can determine what 
stakeholders and what programs to implement in order to benefit that company in the long term.    
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